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THE HAPPY COUPLE:
LAW AND LITERATURE
Robin West
The Happy Couple: Law and Literature, J. Neville Turner and Pamela
Williams, eds. Sydney, The Federation Press, 1994.
The Happy Couple: Law and Literature, is a collection of thirty twopapers (plus a quiz on Dickens), most of which were delivered atthe second annual convention of the Australian Law and Literature
Association, held at Monash University in 1991. In their Preface to the
collection, the editors note that this is the first Australian collection of work
in law and literature, and explain that it is, in their view, a representative
sampling ofAustralian work in the field (xv). The book as a whole attests not
only to the range of interests and subject matter, but also of disciplinary
expertise and style covered by the Australian Law and Literature movement;
as the editors suggest in their preface~ there is truly something here for
everyone (xvi).
As a collection of individual, scholarly performances, this book could not
be better. These short, lively essays educate, delight and surprise in a
thoroughly engaging way. Although I cannot possibly do justice to the depth
and breadth of the collection in this review, let me mention the central points
of just a few of the essays to give a sense of the scope of issues and types of
arguments undertaken. In The Poetics ofInfanticide, Simon Petch argues that
particular texts of Wordsworth and Scott that deal in some way with
infanticide reveal an anxiety about, and in some instances, a covert
condemnation of institutions such as marriage that legitimise and cabin
female sexuality (52-61). In Dickens and the Law (one of several essays on
Dickens), KJA Asche explores the active roles Dickens undertook as
propagandist, entertainer and "purveyor of the colour and interest of legal
situations," all in an effort to achieve meaningful humanistic legal reform
(81-93). In Women, Law and Literature: Representations of Women and the
Law in American and Australian Fiction, Elaine Barry explores the
reflections of women's changing legal and social status in nineteenth century
literature, focusing in particular on that era's "sentimental novels~' by and
about women (99-113). In a tremendously interesting chapter, entitled
'Literature of the Holocaust: The Testimonial of the Witness', that I will
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discuss in slightly more detail in a moment. Sidra Kranz Moshinsky argues
that the writings of Jews during the Holocaust, secreted in various hiding
places in the ghettos and concentration camps of Eastern Europe, should be
understood both as literary texts, and, importantly, as peculiarly legal texts
as well: the writings were often intended to be read, and should be read, as
distinctively legal documents (157-166).
In The Ethics of Meaning, James Boyd White (apparently an honorary
Australian for purposes of the conference and collection), closely reads two
political texts, each of which attempt to justify war - Agamemnon's ironic
speech to his tired, demoralised, and very likely disgusted Greek warriors, as
portrayed in the Iliad, and Abraham Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address,
delivered in 1865, and after "three years of unimaginably hideous civil war"
- and then goes on to argue that inherent in the work of writing and reading
such political texts is a distinctively ethical performance the point of which
is to bring the author and audience together in some fonn of community
(269-285).
In Re-Writing Law as Postmodern Fiction: The Poetics of Child Abuse,
Terry Threadgold deconstructs a set of documents from a particular case in
which abuse and neglect were charged against a parent; traces the way in
which the abuse itself became increasingly invisible as the case turned to the
due process rights of the parent to be heard, rather than the violence visited
upon the child". Threadgold attributes that eventual invisibility to a
combination of two forces, one destabilising and the other lethal: the
postmodem de-centering of 'Truth' on the one hand, and patriarchal attempts
to maintain control over both wayward children and the discourse that
surrounds them on the other (322-341). Each of these essays, and numerous
others, push us to a greater understanding and appreciation of the many
possible connections between law and literature, whether it be through close
readings of Dickens or Hardy, through examinations of popular culture, or
through demonstrations of the possibilities of political critique opened up by
postmodern rewritings of conventional legal texts.
Entirely apart from the quality of the individual performances, however,
the publication of a volume such as this one prompts a "coming of age"
question for the law and literature movement: Is there, evidenced by these,
essays, a ~hared thesis, a common theme, a set of common disciplinary
constraints, or even a common point of departure, for those engaged in law-
literature interdisciplinary work, either in Australia or elsewhere? Has the
Law and Literature movement, either in the United States or in Australia,
revealed its own raison d'etre? Has it put forward an ideal of legal practice,
a jurisprudential account of the nature of law, a conception of justice, or any
other unifying claim, which might guide future work in the field? The
editors' comments in their preface suggest some ambivalence about the
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desirability of identifying some such common "agenda." On the one hand,
following suggestions made by James Boyd White several years ago,l they
applaud the diversity and eclecticism of the movement's participants (xvi).
But on the other hand, they begin their preface with the clear suggestion, and
perhaps the hope, that there is indeed such a common theme. In the opening
sentences of that preface, the editors describe an exchange between
"Counsellor PleydeIl," from Sir Walter Scott's Guy Mannerinq, and his
client, the novel's hero. When the hero expresses surprise that his lawyer's
bookshelves contain books of literature rather than law reports, the editors
explain, Pleydell responds:
These [books of classical literature] are the tools of my
trade. A lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic,
a mere working Mason: if he possesses some knowledge of
these, he may venture to call himself an architect." (xv)
The aphorism does indeed supply a possible understanding of (and
justification for) law-literature studies. Pleydell '8 quip quite directly suggests
the contours of an idealized form of "good" lawyering, where &'good" is
understood in both the craft and moral sense of the word, and to which a
mastery of literature and the skills required to read it critically are both
obviously essential. The "literary lawyer," as we may call this idealized
Pleydellian type, turns to great literature (rather than conventional legal
texts) in a quasi-authoritative way to actually resolve, or at least elucidate,
legal issues. The "books of classical literature" on Counsellor Pleydell's
shelf, such a lawyer might believe, should be understood and used as the
"secondary authority" which "fills in the interstitial gaps" in the common
law, provides the wisdom necessary to guide interpretation of otherwise open
legal texts, and more generally can be called upon to enrich and deepen the
sound "situation-sense" the good lawyer must possess in order to assist
clients. Pleydell and his literary sensibility might, then, constitute an ideal
toward which lawyers ought aspire. If so then "law and literature" scholars
do indeed have an essential mission: to convey to lawyers and law students
a common culture, and a set of cultural and critical skills, which can be and
should be used in such a way as to enrich, ennoble, and, more simply,
complete legal argument and legal education.
However, while a good deal of American Law and Literature"
scholarship - such as, notably, the scholarship of both James Boyd White2
and Martha Nussbaum3 - might be fairly characterized as originating in
this conviction, and although the editors quote and refer to Pleydell's
remarks at several points in their preface (xvI xvi, xvii), it nevertheless seems
fair to say that virtually none of the essays collected in this volume is moved
by the faith in literature, and its centrality to good lawyering, to which
Counselor Pleydell gives voice. Whatever may be the driving conviction of
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other law and literature scholars, none of the authors in this text seek to use
literature so as to convert the mason into the architect; to transform the craft
lawyer into the artist-lawyer; to elevate the legal argument to the status of a
literary text. None uses literature, either narrowly or broadly understood t so
as to elucidate a particular legal issue, or complete an otherwise open-
textured legal argument. If this volume is representative, the construction,
elaboration, and defense of the "literary lawyer" alluded to by Counselor
Pleydell and described above, does not seem to be the driving motivation, the
final cause, or even a peripheral interest, of the Australian Law and
Literature movement.
If not a common quest for an idealised fonn of lawyering, is there
anything at all that unifies this "movement," or these papers, or these
authors? I think the answer is clearly "no" - there is no discernible thesis, or
shared agenda that even comes close, for example, to the centrality of both
nonnative and descriptive claims regarding efficiency to the Law and
Economics movement. On the other hand, it does seem to me that there is a
"family" of common concerns that drive some of these essays, at least some
of which are also reflected in American law and literature studies as well. I
want to mention two, both of which have little to do with the ~'literary
lawyer't ofPleydeU's remarks, but both of which also, I think, not only partly
account for the turn within legal studies toward literature, but justify it as
well.
First, it is surely significant that such a large number of the essays in this
volume deal either directly or indirectly with the difficulties of "speaking,"
in any fonn ofdiscourse -legal, literary, or otherwise - about unspeakable
violence. Thus, James Boyd White confronts the possibility that one cannot
ethically speak of warfare in any manner other than to condemn it (277);
Sidra Manchinsky speaks directly to the well-known difficulties of
discussing the indescribable horrors of the holocaust (158); several writers
deal in different ways with the too-often unmentioned brutalities visited
upon children through the exploitation of their labour and their sexuality
(Peter Boss, 41-51; Simon Petch, 52-61; KJA Asche, 81-93; Terry
Threadgold, 322-341). All of these writers share with some of the major
architects of the American Law and Literature movement an impulse to
confront the very general problem of "Violence and the Word," to use
Cover's provocative phrase,4 or to interrogate the "Failure of the Word," to
borrow from Richard Weisberg's seminal study,5 or in a more hopeful vein,
to look at the redemptive possibilities posed by "the Word and the Law," to
invoke a recent lawlliterature study by Milner Ball. 6
This focus on extreme violence and the potency or impotency of the
Word as a vehicle for its description or containment, if it is characteristic of
law and literature studies, is surely one noteworthy point of contrast with the
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Law and Economics movement, which, perhaps because of its preoccupation
with "free" markets, rarely centralises large-scale violence as its primary
subject matter.
We might very teotatively conclude from this highly unscientific
sampling that at least a good many Law and Literature practitioners, in
Australia as well as in the United States, are looking to the communitarian
promises of words and discourses (and the more multi-disciplinary the
better), for a healing of the wounds we inflict on ourselves and each other in
our most non-discursive and anti-communitarian moments. Some of us find
in those words and discourses "acts of hope," to quote from the title of James
Boyd White's latest book,? and others find acts of legitimation, of hypocrisy,
of resentment, of mendacity_ But it is surely significant that so many Law
and Literature scholars are drawn to search for connections and
disconnections between acts of "unspeakable" violence, on the one hand,
and words, discourses, and "the word," on the other, whatever the quality of
those connection we think we have uncovered. The essays in this volume -
some intentionally and some perhaps not - further that quest.
The second "common concern" of these essays is methodologicaL Like a
good bit of Law and Literature scholarship, many of the essays in this
volume question, either directly or indirectly, the boundaries between Law
and Literature, or between legal discourse on the one hand and literary
discourse on the other, either by suggesting that there are no necessary and
sufficient conditions for either category, and hence no defensible "boundary"
at all, or alternatively, by questioning the traditional placement of a text
within one camp or the other. Thus, a number ofAmerican law and literature
studies aim to show, in some way, that Hlegal texts" share some set of
features with literary texts: that cases can be read as stories; that
communities; and that legal texts, like literary texts, constitutional arguments
contain more fiction than history; that jurisprudence can be read
aesthetically; that legal arguments, like literary texts, create ethical as well as
aesthetic communities; and that legal texts, like literary texts, can be
"deconstructed" in a way that reveals otherwise hidden political structures.
A number of the essays in this volume share that general goal. To note
just two examples, in Rewriting Law as Postmodern Fiction, Terry
Threadgold argues that legal texts can be re-written and read in just such a
way (322-341), and in The Odd Couple: Statutes and Literature, Jeffrey
Barnes argues that statutes do at least, on occasion, possess what are
traditionally regarded as literary virtues (296-309). To whatever degree the
Law and Literature movement is committed to illuminating the literary
dimensions of legal discourse, this collection significantly furthers that
project.
The striking, and to my mind, unique contribution of this collection,
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however (to our general and evolving understanding of the raison d'etre of
law and literature studies)" lies in the number and quality of essays which in
effect reverse this traditional concern, and ask not whether law possesses
literary attributes, but rather, whether, when, and why literary texts, or texts
commonly understood as literary, possess legal (or political, or ethical)
dimensions which should be understood as such. These scholars are
concerned with what might be called the "legal-performative" qualities of
texts which are typically regarded as only propositional, descriptive,
infonnative, or fictive. Thus, in Dickens and the Law, Asche examines the
effect of Dickens' fiction on the law, rather than the more common in
Dickens' scholarship, to wit, the use by Dickens, in his fiction, of law and
legal characters (81-93).
In Comina to Terms with Villainy, Joe Grixti looks at the stabilising,
legitimating impact of fictionalised treatments of serial killers, which, by
falsely and perversely suggesting the normalcy and universality of truly
exceptional brutality, pushes audiences to accept a repressive state as the
price to pay for keeping the beast at bay ,(187-203).
In a very different vein, in The Logic of Metonymy, Roseanne Kennedy
looks at the ways in which the rhetorical style of Catherine MacKinnon has,
in effect, "policed" feminism, centralising some and marginalising other
accounts of women's own sexual experiences (342-359). All of these authors
ask, in various ways, what the texts they are studying are doing, rather than
what they are saying, arguing, proposing, describing or claiming. And all of
these authors, in different ways, have identified attributes of these literary or
argumentative texts which are also characteristic of traditionally understood
legal or political texts - MacKinnon's metonymic logic polices: the polices:
the fictIOnalised serial killer legitimatises; Dickens' texts refonn and
humanise. If this collection is representative, then it is fair to expect of the
law and literature movement that it will broaden our understanding not only
of law, but of the literary works which on occasion at least perform law-like
functions, and in often surprising places.
Let me close by looking in more detail at one essay which, like those
described above,' also looks to the legal-perfonnative features of literary
texts, but which (unlike those above), does so quite explicitly, and that is
Sidra Kranz Moshinsky"s short and moving essay, Literature of the
Holocaust (157-166). Through a close reading of texts authored by
Holocaust victims, Moshinsky argues that the authors of these texts intended
that they be received as, among much else, specifically legal documents
(162-165). Her claim, in brief, is that the authors of these texts meant them
to serve as evidence, or testimony, in some future of some sort, in which their
captors, tonnenters and murderers would be held accountable under the Rule
of Law. Moshinsky quotes from several texts to further her argument,
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including the following, taken from a wall carving in the synagogue of Kovel
on September 15, 1942:
A chill passes through us ... here come our murderers,
dressed up ... their filthy hands adorned in white gloves,
they herd us two by two ... tender-hearted brothers and
sisters 0 how hard it is to part from this beautiful world
forever let no one who remains alive ever forget -
Jewish boys and girls from OUf Jewish street, innocent of
any wrong-doing. Wreak vengeance on our murderers.
(quoted at 163).
Her second example comes from an anonymous source, "written during
the deportations from the Warsaw ghetto," and unearthed at the end of the
war:
We want to believe that there is some sense in still being
alive among the shambles, among human hyenas and
jackals who live by stripping the dead. These documents
and notes are a remnant resembling a clue in a detective
story. I remember from childhood such a novel by Conan
Doyle, in which the dying victim writes with a faint hand
one word on the wall containing the proof of the criminars
guilt. That word, scrawled by the dying man, influenced my
imagination in the past. The records left by us, whose
survival is so uncertain, remind me of that stereotype image
that once so moved me. We are noting the evidence of the
crime. (quoted at 163)
From these fragments, and others like them, Moshinsky concludes that
Holocaust writing umoves in two directions" and belongs to "both the
literature scholar and the lawyer":
Although this particular section does not give facts, such as names, dates
and places, these details can be found in other parts of this text and they give
the whole a documentary value. Lines such as "dying victim," "proof of the
criminal's guilt," and "evidence of the crime" reinforce the evidentiary
aspect of the text. On the other hand, one could read and analyse this passage
in much the same way as one would any piece of literature. One could note
the rhetorical devices, the inter-textual references, the narratorial voice ... To
approach writing of the Holocaust looking either for literary or evidential
information but not for both is, in my opinion, misguided. (163)
What is it about these texts which renders them distinctively legal? It is
important to note what Moshinsky is not arguing, in order to better
appreciate what she is: she is not making the claim that these texts are legal
because all texts are in some way performative, or because the line between
the legal and the literary is inevitably a blurred one~ or because both legal and
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literary texts are political, and hence share that common denominator.
Rather, she specifically argues that legal and literary texts are indeed distinct
genres, and that because they are distinct, when one discovers a text which
is in some way both, one has discovered something quite remarkable indeed
(163-64). The discovery of a pointedly legal text outside of the predictable
legal institutions and structures in which such texts are typically found, in
other words, prompts us to ask what it is that renders the text legal, since it
clearly is not legal by virtue of being produced during a legal proceeding, or
originating in a legal institution. The discovery of a text which can sensibly
be called legal, but which is outside of familiar legal-institutional contexts,
in brief, prompts a jurisprudential inquiry into the nature of law, and it does
so in a quite profound and distinctive way.
What is it, then, that renders these Holocaust texts legal, if Moshinsky is
right to argue that indeed they are? Moshinsky's own answer points to their
evidentiary, testimonial, character; they are, she argues, "dying
declarations," by which she means a well known and highly trusted type of
evidence in common law courts (162). As Moshinsky explains by quoting an
eighteenth century case, 4'dying declarations" are declarations which
otherwise would be inadmissible hearsay, but when made by homicide
victims, "in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when
every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced,
and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the
truth," they are admitted as evidence for the truth of whatever it is they assert
regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused (162). The writings of the
Holocaust victims, Moshinsky argues, like the declarations of the homicide
victim, are made under precisely these circumstances. They ought, then, to
be read and received as legal, evidentiary texts, for whatever their value or
meaning as literature, they were also intended to be read as such. This
answer, though, is incomplete. To return to the definition Moshinsky
supplies, we might ask what the Court in question fails to ask, and that is
what those "powerful considerations" are, upon either the homicide victim
or the Holocaust 'Yriter, which render their dying declarations trustworthy
"testimony"? Although Moshinsky doesn't fully answer the question, what
she does argue clearly suggests one. and it is a suggestion that might bring
us to the heart of at least a good deal of Law and Literature studies. To
understand Holocaust literature, Moshinsky argues, one must first
understand the pragmatic view of language held by its authors, and the
circumstances within which that view arose. Holocaust victims who were
moved to write of their experiences, almost by necessity, viewed language
and words as reliable, sturdy vehicles of communication, and this in spite of
the lethal abuse of language which victimised them, and of which they were
painfully aware. Their conception of language was, in a word, hopeful.
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Moshinsky quotes one author who makes the point directly:
The desire to write is as strong as the repugnance of words.
We hate them, because they too often served as a cover for
emptiness or meanness. We despise them, for they are pale
in comparison to the emotions tormenting us. And yet, in
the past the word meant human dignity and was man's best
possession - an instrument of communication between
people. (anonymous text written in Warsaw in 1942, quoted
at 159).
I want to suggest that one answer to the question posed above - what
are the "considerations" which render "dying declarations," both of the
homicide victim and the genocide victim, admissible as legal evidence - is
that the "consideration" which renders a dying declaration peculiarly
trustworthy, hence "testimonial", and hence a peculiarly "legal" text, derives
from a sort of "testimonial hope" imputed to the dying victim. One might
speak while dying for any number of reasons, but a homicide victim, by
contrast, testifies when dying as to the identity of his murderer in the hope
that the homicidal act which has been witnessed and suffered, will some day
be condemned, and will be condemned in a lawful and civilised manner. The
hope of the victim in giving the declaration is the hope that the killer will be
apprehended, tried and convicted.
When given by the victim of genocide, such a declaration does indeed
rest on the hope that his language will communicate, as Moshinsky explains.
But the declaration clearly rests on not only a hope for language, but also a
hope for law. It is the hope that civilization will right itself; that it will
rediscover its moral compass. It is the hope that justice will prevail, or at
least become at some future time more than just an ever-present possibility.
If that is right, then Moshinsky's study suggests a promising analysis of
the legality of the Holocaust texts she studies. These texts do indeed seem
evidentiary and testimonial, as Moshinsky argues. Furthermore, they seem
paradigmatically so: if any text outside of traditional legal institutions is
peculiarly legal, these are, and if that's right, then these texts might tell us
something jurisprudentially important about the nature of law itself. If these
texts are legal, despite the lack of legal trappings, and if their heart lies in the
expression of hope to which they give rise and on which they must rest, then
the essence of the "legal voice", or the "legal text", must at least in part
simply be the hope of future judgment, or the hope of future justice. If this
hope - the hope for Law, the hope of legalism, the hope for eventual justice
- survived in the circumstances surrounding the writing of these texts, then
the hope must truly run deep. One testimonial inference - perhaps
inadvertent, perhaps not - which we might be justified in drawing from
these searing texts, is that law itself is an act of hope,8 which by necessity
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rests on a faith in the will of the human community to some day re-create it.
NOTES
1 James Boyd White (1988), Law and Literature: No Manifesto, 39 Mercer L. Rev.
739
2 James Boyd White (1984), When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and
Reconstruction ofl..Lmguage, Character, and Community; Justice as
Translation; An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (1990); Hercules' Bow:
Essays on the Rhetoric And Poetics OfLaw (1985).
3 Martha Nussbaum (1994), Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the
Lal1l, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 714; Equity and Mercy 22 Philosophy and Public
Affairs 83 (1993); The Use and Abuse ofPhilosophy in Legal Education, 107
Stan L. Rev. 714 (1994).
4 Robert Cover (1986), Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601.
5 Richard Weisberg (1984), The Failure ofthe Word: The Protagonist as Lawyer in
Modem Fiction.
6 Milner Ball (1993), The Word and the Law.
7 James Boyd White (1994), Acts oJHope: Creating Authority In Literature, Law and
Politics.
8 With thanks and credit, of course, to James Boyd White, and the book and book's
title from which this phrase has been lifted. James Boyd White (1994), Acts of
Hope: Creating Authorityin Literature, Law and Politics.
240
